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The constitutional principles that bind our free society instruct that the
American people must "hold the judgeship in the highest esteem, that they re-
gard it as the symbol of impartial, fair, and equal justice under law."'1 Accord-
ingly, in contrast with the political branches, the Supreme Court's decisions
"are legitimate only when [the Court] seeks to dissociate itself from individual
or group interests, and to judge by disinterested and more objective standards." 2
As Justice Frankfurter said, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. 3
Almost instinctively, once a President appoints a judge to sit on the Su-
preme Court,4 the public earmarks the Justice as an incarnation of impartiality,
neutrality, and trustworthiness. Not surprisingly then, Presidents have looked to
the Court for appointments to high profile and important committees of
5
national concern. It is among members of the judiciary that a President can
find individuals certain to obtain the immediate respect of the American people,
and often the world community. It is a judge's neutrality, fair-mindedness, and
integrity that once again label him a person of impartiality and fairness, a per-
son who seeks justice, and a President's first choice to serve the nation. The
characteristics that led to a judge's initial appointment under our adversary sys-
tem, and which lend themselves to appearances of propriety and justice in our
courts, often carry over into extrajudicial activities as well. As Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., then a professor at the Yale Law School, stated:
[t]he appointment of a Justice of the Supreme Court to head a governmental com-
mission or inquiry usually occurs because of the existence of a highly controversial
issue which calls for some kind of official or authoritative resolution .... And the
use of Supreme Court Justices, experience shows, is generally prompted by a presi-
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2003.
1. JOEL B. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES 1 (1965) (internal citation omitted).
2. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 1N AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 108-09
(1976).
3. Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the Judicial Process, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1993, at
5, 20 (quoting Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
4. This Note will focus exclusively on the activities of Supreme Court Justices for the purposes of
organization and expediency.
5. Robert B. McKay aggregates a selective yet substantial record of Supreme Court Justices' non-
judicial activities beginning with Chief Justice John Jay and continuing through Chief Justice Warren
Burger. His work demonstrates the commonality and degree to which most Presidents rely upon and
look to the Court for political participation separate from the bench. Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary
andNonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 27-36 (1970).
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dential desire to trade on the prestige of the Court in laying the matter to rest. 6
But there has been opposition to appointing Supreme Court Justices to ex-
trajudicial roles since the framing of the Constitution.7 This opposition argues
that preserving the neutrality and passivity of a Justice is necessary to uphold
the legitimacy of our adversary system. 8 These same arguments are, interest-
ingly enough, relied upon by the President when he appoints a Justice to such a
role. It is upon this paradox-that a President's rationale for the extrajudicial
appointments of Supreme Court Justices and an opponent's rationale for con-
testing such appointments are based on the same idea, that "justice must satisfy
the appearance ofjustice"--that this Note will focus.
Part I will define and highlight the characteristics of the adversary system
employed by Anglo-American courts today. Once the reader understands a
judge's role in adversary theory as a neutral and passive fact-finder, and
nothing else, it becomes obvious why the public, and most importantly, the
President considers a Supreme Court Justice the embodiment of impartiality,
fairness, and justice. Part II will provide historical examples of Presidents who,
motivated by this perception, appointed Justices to extrajudicial positions. Part
III will discuss several different modes and examples of opposition to Supreme
Court Justices' participation in these activities. Opposition is often based on the
need to preserve the neutrality, impartiality, passivity, and ultimately the air of
6. Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 327
(1969) (statement of Ralph K. Winter, Jr.) [hereinafter Hearings]. His statement implies that a President
is often concerned with creating a neutral and impartial arena to conduct such commissions in order to
convince the public that justice is being served. The "executive interest in appointing judges is the desire
to add prestige to presidential commissions." Wendy E. Ackerman, Comment, Separation of Powers
and Judicial Service on Presidential Commissions, 53 U. CHI. REV. 993, 1019 (1986).
7. To facilitate discussion, it is necessary to distinguish, as McKay does, between quasi-judicial and
extrajudicial activities. McKay, supra note 5, at 20. Quasi-judicial activities include "those activities of
judges that are not part of their assigned duties, but are related to the judicial function" such as lecturing,
teaching and writing, as well as law reform advocacy. Id. In comparison, extrajudicial activities include
the practice of law, business and charitable activities, partisan politics, public service, and personal and
social relationships. Id. at 22-26. The latter category is the focus of this Note.
8. It is necessary to also distinguish between two often confused concepts when analyzing opposi-
tion to extrajudicial appointments of Supreme Court Justices. In re President's Comm'n on Organized
Crime, 783 F.2d 370, 379 (3d Cir. 1986). There is the constitutional separation of powers principle that,
under some circumstances, judges may violate "by voluntarily undertaking nonjudicial activity which
intrudes substantially in the domain of another branch or so weakens their ability to function as Article
III judges that the courts are substantially hindered in the proper performance of their duties." Id; see,
e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851) (finding that the duty assigned to an Article
III court by Congress to receive and adjust claims against the United States arising under the Treaty of
1819 with Spain was not the exercise of judicial power under Article III and therefore violated the
principle of separation of powers); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (holding that the 1792
statute authorizing circuit courts to pass on the right of individuals to be placed on the pension list of
Revolutionary War veterans to violate separation of powers because the power was not judicial in na-
ture). The latter concept must not be confused with the line of opposition focused on ethical considera-
tions and accepted notions of propriety in judicial conduct. In re President's Comm'n, 783 F.2d at 379.
These ethical considerations are also of the highest importance even though "their violation will not
necessarily implicate constitutional prohibitions." Id. at 378. It is this concept that remains the concen-
tration of this Note.
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justice that surrounds the Court and legitimizes the judiciary and its decisions.
There is concern that placing Justices in extrajudicial roles might destroy their
necessary neutrality and appearance of justice. Part IV will discuss the implica-
tions of this paradox and the subsequent effect on executive decisions to ap-
point a Justice to serve in such extrajudicial capacities and judicial decisions to
accept. Part V will conclude.
I. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND THE RESULTANT JUDICIAL CHARACTER
To satisfy the principle that justice must appear just, American courts have
long employed "a system of procedure that depends upon a neutral and passive
fact finder." 9 The central precept of this adversary process is that "out of the
sharp clash of proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic
setting is most likely to come the information from which a neutral and passive
decision maker can resolve a litigated dispute in a manner that is acceptable
both to the parties and to society."' 0 Adversary theory
suggests that neutrality and passivity are essential not only to ensure an evenhanded
consideration of each case, but also to convince society at large that the judicial sys-
tem is trustworthy. When a decision maker becomes an active questioner or other-
wise participates in a case, he is likely to be perceived as partisan rather than neu-
tral. I
In other words, this adversary method of dispute resolution, with judicial
neutrality and passivity at its core, ensures the essential appearance of fair-
ness. 12
As laid out in the Constitution, the President nominates the individuals who
compose the judicial bodies that are players in the adversary model of judicial
review.1 3 "Although the question of the methodology to be employed for judi-
cial appointments was subjected to intensive floor debate at the Constitutional
Convention... criteria for such appointments were neither debated nor did
9. Stephen A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 713, 713 (1983). Landsman, in STEPHEN A. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION
AND DEFENSE 19-20 (1984), provides a brief discussion of the development of judicial neutrality and
passivity in the adversary system from its beginnings in early eighteenth century England to the struggle
for judicial neutrality played out in the United States in the early 1800s.
10. Landsman, supra note 9, at 714.
11. LANDSMAN, supra note 9, at 3.
12. In addition to judicial neutrality and passivity, the adversary system is also characterized by
party control of the investigation and presentation of evidence and argument. Ellen E. Sward, Values,
Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1988-89). The adversary
system is generally cast in comparison to the judicial system of continental Europe, the inquisitorial sys-
tem. Inquisitorial adjudication takes a very different approach to justice than the adversarial system:
"[T]he judge is primarily responsible for supervising the gathering of evidence necessary to resolve the
issue.., the decisionmaker is not, therefore, merely a receptor for information at a neatly packaged trial,
but is, instead, an active participant." Id. at 313.
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the Supreme Court."
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they appear to loom as a matter of either significance or puzzlement.' ' 4
Although the Constitution sets forth no criteria, it is clear from history and ex-
perience that specific decision-based reasons or motivations for presidential
nominations exist. Henry J. Abraham suggests four continually occurring moti-
vations: "[F]irst, objective merit; second, personal friendship; third, balancing
'representation' or 'representativeness' on the Court; and fourth, 'real' political
and ideological compatibility."'
5
The President, in accord with the Constitution, presumably motivated by
some of these rationales, and dedicated to the adversary tradition, pursues a
candidate who embodies the characteristics that make for a neutral and passive
judge. There is no single characteristic or quality of an individual, however,
which assures neutrality and passivity. Many American Justices, unlike jurists
of continental Europe who are most often trained specifically for the bench,
have no judicial background. 16 Accordingly, Presidents must look to a candi-
date's individual character to gauge the presence of "good judge" qualities such
as neutrality and passivity. Sheldon Goldman identifies qualities, characteris-
tics, or traits that are associated with the ideal type of "good judge," most nota-
bly:
1. Neutrality as to the Parties in Litigation. Nothing ill becomes a judge more than
a reputation for being biased or playing favorites among disputants.
2. Fair-mindedness. A sensitivity to the requirements of procedural due process as a
means to a fair trial is the hallmark of a fair-minded judge.
[3.] Personal Integrity. A judge must have high moral standards and be able to
withstand political and economic pressures and carry out the law to the best of his
or her ability.
[4.] Ability to Handle Judicial Power Sensibly. Of course, this quality is defined dif-
ferently by those who differ as to what is the "sensible" or the "common sense" use
of judicial power. For example, some believe that a good judge is one who exercises
judicial power in support of civil rights and civil liberties, and with a particular sen-
sitivity to racial and sexual discrimination and the rights of the underdogs of soci-
ety. Others believe that a good judge will exercise judicial power modestly, with
great sensitivity to the limited capacity of judges to solve society's problems, and
make deference to the policymaking prerogatives of the democratic branches of
17government.
14. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 17-18 (1999). The few delegates
who did vocalize the issue did so by assuming that merit, as opposed to favoritism, should govern. Id. at
18.
15. Id. at 2. See also GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 7-24 (discussing the political motivation that con-
tinually pervades the nominations behind Supreme Court Justices).
16. ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at 44.
17. Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make a "Good" Judge, 462
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 112, 113-14 (1982) (emphasis added). Other qualities that Goldman
lists include:
[1]. Being Well Versed in the Law. Obviously a person who has had poor legal training, little
Vol. 21:501, 2003
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These "qualities" arguably hint at a passive and neutral judge-that is, a
judge who will sit comfortably in the seat of impartiality designated by our ju-
dicial system. In order to maintain an "appearance of justice," so crucial to so-
ciety's belief in the validity of equal justice under law, a President's ideal ap-
pointee will posses such qualities that contribute to neutrality and passivity.
And once the Justice is appointed to the Supreme Court, the nation and the
world at large will view him or her as possessing such characteristics.
II. EXAMPLES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
A. The Constitutional Period. Chief Justice John Jay
"A dearth of capable men in the early public life of the Nation gave rise to
the frequent use of judges in nonjudicial activities. .. "18 The numerous extra-
judicial activities of Chief Justice John Jay strongly support this observation.
Jay advised President Washington and Secretary Hamilton on various matters,
and Washington appointed Jay to the diplomatic mission assigned to settle the
continuing British-American dispute.'
9
As further indication of this common reliance on judicial participation in
such activities in early American government, Congress and the President also
approved use of the Justices, most notably the Chief Justice, in certain ex offi-
cio capacities. 20 The President assigned the Chief Justice to a commission
empowered to inspect the operation of the United States Mint and appointed the
or no experience as a practicing lawyer, and who is ignorant of the law or does not have the
ability and desire to master it cannot dispense justice under law.
[2]. Ability to Think and Write Logically and Lucidly. Fuzzy thinking and poor craftsmanship
are highly undesirable, not only for judges who write opinions but also for judges who must
make rulings from the bench or instruct juries.
[3.] Good Physical and Mental Health. It is difficult to believe that someone could function
effectively as a judge with an alcohol or drug dependency, with severe personality disorders,
or with a serious physical condition that impairs one's ability to function normally at the intel-
lectual level or that requires medication that might affect one's judgment.
[4.] Judicial Temperament. Effective trial conduct requires a judge to be even-tempered even
under the tensions and pressure-cooker atmosphere of, for example, a prolonged criminal trial,
and to be courteous to lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and courtroom personnel. At the appellate
court level, judicial temperament might well include the ability and willingness to be a full
member of the "team" by doing one's share of opinion-writing and working with colleagues to
produce the most authoritative and clear decision as expeditiously as possible.
Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
18. Honorable Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, The Quick Solution to Complex Problems: The Article
III Judge, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1668, 1670 (1995) (internal citation omitted).
19. McKay, supra note 5, at 27.
20. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123,
139 (1973). Similar types of ex officio memberships still exist today. For example, under 20 U.S.C.
§ 41, the Chief Justice along with the President, the Vice President, and the heads of executive depart-
ments "are constituted an establishment by the name of the Smithsonian Institution for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men, and by that name shall be known and have perpetual succession
with the powers, limitations, and restrictions hereinafter contained, and no other." 20 U.S.C. § 41
(1994). Accordingly, to this day the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court serves as a mem-
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powered to inspect the operation of the United States Mint and appointed the
Chief Justice, along with other cabinet members, to the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion, which had the task of reducing and refunding the Revolutionary War
debt.21 "The quality of currency and debt repayment were both hot political is-
sues in the founding period., 22 Accordingly, people felt it was "extremely im-
portant that the public have confidence in the administrators of the [Sinking]
[Fund .... Hamilton and Congress saw the Chief Justice as an individual who
would enhance the operation of the Sinking Fund Commission and increase
public trust in it.'23 Given the public's trust and seemingly absolute confidence
in the judiciary because of its neutral and impartial character, any involvement
of the Chief Justice would create public confidence in such government opera-
tions.24
The frequency with which the early Presidents looked to Jay and his con-
temporary Justices 25 implies that some of the men who had helped write and
ratify the Constitution believed it was ethically proper and constitutionally
permissible for Supreme Court Justices to concurrently hold executive posts.
26
The debates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention suggest that many of the
framers not only expected judges to make off-the-court contributions to the
government, but also viewed such incidents of service favorably.27 Russell
Wheeler has noted that based on the debates, "it is obvious that more than a few
of the prominent delegates felt it quite proper to require some type of extra-
judicial service by the nation's highest jurists. '28 The delegates clearly thought
ber on the board of the Smithsonian Institute. The Chief Justice is also a trustee of the National Gallery
of Art pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 72(a).
21. Wheeler, supra note 20, at 140. See also Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person,
One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1133
(1994).
22. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 2 1, at 1131.
23. Wheeler, supra note 20, at 141.
24. Id. at 140.
25. The most well-known examples, in addition to John Jay, are John Marshall's simultaneous
service as Secretary of State and Oliver Ellsworth's simultaneous service as Special Ambassador to
France. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 21, at 1131. Marshall's simultaneous service is not a perfect
demonstration of extrajudicial appointments since President Adams appointed Marshall as Secretary of
State before appointing him to the Court. However, Jefferson, who became President after Adams, asked
Marshall to remain as Secretary of State even though Marshall had begun his service on the Court. Al-
though this short overlap seems quite tenuous as an example of extrajudicial appointments, Calabresi
states that its importance lies in its well-known existence: "Marshall's dual role is most famous since,
during his tenure of Secretary of State, he himself signed and sealed, but failed to deliver, the commis-
sion appointing William Marbury as Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. This infamous
commission would later become the subject of his landmark opinion in Marbury v. Madison." Id. at
1131 n.423 (internal citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1132.
27. Wheeler, supra note 20, at 126.
28. Id. at 127. Wheeler discusses two of what he considers the "[m]ost notable of the proposals for
obligatory extrajudicial service": Madison's plan for a council of legislative revision and a proposal that
would have compelled judges to provide advisory opinions to other governmental entities. Id. These
plans, according to Wheeler, reflect a "conviction that those who held the judicial office had skills of
statesmanship which they were obliged to put extrajudicially to the nation's service." Id.
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that a Justice's character leaks an implicit perfume of impartiality that would
imbue the extrajudicial commissions and activities with the same smell of jus-
tice.
Many of the Framers focused on these advantages that derive from assign-
ing the judges to extrajudicial service. Madison, for example, made a proposal
for a "Council of Revision," to be comprised of the President "and a convenient
number of the National Judiciary... with authority to examine every act of the
National Legislature before it shall operate. .. ,29 He then spoke of the per-
ceived advantages of such judicial participation: "[M]uch good... [would]
proceed from the perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic character...
[which] the Code of laws ... [would] receive from the Judiciary talents."
30
B. Justice Owen Roberts: Chairman of the Pearl Harbor Investigation
Justice Owen Roberts has been described as a "man capable of error but in-
capable of persisting in it-a powerful, effective, eloquent advocate; a firm and
honest judge and upright citizen of the nation and the world....',3 He was
hailed for his "independent spirit" and for standing "aloof from total surrender
to either the 'liberal' or the 'conservative' position" 32 while a member of the
Court from 1930-1945. The Senate's confirmation of Justice Roberts on June 2,
1930, without any negative votes, assured the public that President Herbert
Hoover's nominee embodied justice and neutrality.33 Justice Roberts ap-
proached his position on the Court with avid impartiality-so much so that
"[b]y the end of 1931 he... could be characterized only as [an] 'unreliable
member[] of the so-called liberal majority. ' ' 34 Roberts's appearance as a non-
partisan Republican on the Roosevelt Court caused the President to look to him
for extrajudicial service.35
Shortly after the news of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor reached Wash-
29. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinaf-
ter RECORDS].
30. Id. at 139.
31. John J. McCloy, Owen J. Roberts' Extra Curiam Activities, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 350, 353
(1955).
32. David Burner, Owen J. Roberts, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, at 1117, 1128 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds. 1997) [herein-
after THE JUSTICES].
33. See id. at 1120.
34. Id. at 1121 (citation omitted from the original text).
35. Id. at 1127. Roberts engaged in several extrajudicial activities throughout his tenure on the Su-
preme Court. The most well known is his appointment as chairman of the Commission that conducted
the investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In addition, he served on the Mixed Claims
Commission of the United States and Germany that dealt with the Black Tom cases, see Owen J. Rob-
erts, Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1, 2 (1949), and, "[i]n
1943[,] Roberts headed the Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monu-
ments in Europe, which cataloged and traced the art objects stolen or destroyed by the Germans."
Burner, supra note 32, at 1128.
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ington on December 7, 1941, "the name of Owen J. Roberts loomed up as the
man best fitted to direct the investigation of the disaster at the great naval base
on Oahu." 36 President Roosevelt sought to appoint a commission to "ascertain
and report the facts relating to the attack" for the stated purpose of providing
"bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judg-
ment on the part of the United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to
such successes as were achieved by the enemy .... ."37 Arguably, as a result of
Roosevelt's desire for "sound decisions" on the matter, he agreed favorably
with the suggestion of Secretary of War Stimson that Justice Roberts serve as
the chairman of the Commission.38 Certainly this selection was the natural
consequence of a pressing national necessity and Roberts's already prominent
career and character as a fearless, independent and thorough fact-finder. 39 Rob-
erts's profile as a man of independence and neutrality was probably most
apparent to Roosevelt and his associates from Justice Roberts's previous
extrajudicial activity as umpire of the Mixed Claims Commission of the United
States and Germany that dealt mostly with the so-called Black Tom cases.4 °
John McCloy has described Roberts's important service on the Mixed
Claims Commission, noting that he
deliberately set aside several decisions which had been handed down during the
course of those cases.... When new evidence had been adduced in those cases
which seriously reflected upon certain facts at the foundation of the earlier
decisions, Justice Roberts unhesitatingly swept aside the old decisions, in effect
acknowledging error, and he entered judgment accordingly. He took this step,
which was perhaps unprecedented in international arbitration, even though the
consequences were most awkward for both of the governments involved.
4 1
C. Justice Robert Jackson: Chief Prosecutor for the United States at
Nuremberg
"To confess error was for him a show of strength, not of weakness. No man
who ever sat on the Supreme Court, it seems to me, mirrored the man in him in
his judicial work more completely than did Justice Jackson," wrote Justice
Felix Frankfurter.42 These endearing words portray both the intelligence and
honor with which Justice Robert Jackson sat on the Court and the respect the
world held for him. He was described as having "a calm which no crisis could
disturb, and standards of honorable conduct which were both rigorous and un-
36. McCloy, supra note 31, at 351-52.
37. Exec. Order No. 8983, 3 C.F.R. 1046 (1941) (emphasis added).
38. McCloy, supra note 3 1, at 352.
39. Id. at 351.
40. See id. at 353; see also United States ex rel. Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Germany, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
339(1933).
41. McCloy, supra note 31, at 353.




Jackson, a self-educated man from a rural background, was admitted to the
Bar at the age of twenty-one with little formal study.44 In 1934, after twenty
years in his own law practice in Jamestown, New York, Jackson left "for his
spectacular national career. '45 From the time Jackson became General Counsel
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in February, 1934 until his unanimous con-
firmation to the Supreme Court on July 7, 1941, he established his abilities and
intelligence in numerous legal positions throughout Washington.46 By the time
he reached the Court, Jackson had successfully held the titles of General Coun-
sel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Tax Division, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, and Solicitor General.47
But it was more than Jackson's professional experience and career in Wash-
ington that influenced Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to follow Jackson's
suggestions on the subject of legal recourse against Nazi aggressors upon Ger-
many's surrender to the Allies. It was Jackson's pronounced belief in justice,
apparent both in his position regarding fair prosecution of the Nazis as well as
in his judicial work on the Supreme Court, that led to his extrajudicial appoint-
ment as chief prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trials. Accord-
ing to Jackson, a judge is a man who does not "let the personalities on either
side interfere with his deciding the case on the facts and the law. ' '48 "He had the
habit of truth-seeking and faithfully served justice. 'A9 Jackson believed in the
necessity of impartiality and neutrality on the bench, and he entertained the
conviction that the power entrusted to the Supreme Court is "saved from mis-
use only by a self-searching disinterestedness almost beyond the lot of men."
50
His assumption of human fallibility, arguably so essential to maintaining
fairness and neutrality as a judge, runs throughout his work. In his dissent in
Massachusetts v. United States, the Justice wrote:
[I]f I have agreed to any prior decision which forecloses what now seems to be a
sensible construction of this Act, I must frankly admit that I was unaware of it....
[E]xcept for any personal humiliation involved in admitting that I do not always
understand the opinions of this Court, I see no reason why I should be consciously
43. Warner W. Gardner, Government Attorney, in Robert H. Jackson, 55 COLuM. L. REV. 438, 439
(1955).
44. Gardner, supra note 43, at 439. Jackson was born on a farm near the village of Spring Creek,
Pennsylvania, on February 13, 1892. He had little post-secondary education and only one year of formal
legal training.
45. Felix Frankfurter, Foreword to Robert H. Jackson: 1892-1954, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 436
(1955).
46. See Gardner, supra note 43, at 440-44.
47. Id.
48. Philip B. Kurland, Robert H. Jackson, in 4 THE JUSTICES, supra note 32, at 1282, 1303 (quoting
Robert Jackson).
49. Frankfurter, supra note 42, at 939.
50. Id. at 938.
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wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday. 51
Roosevelt died suddenly on April 12, 1945, and Vice President Harry S.
Truman succeeded him. The day after the President's death, Justice Jackson
addressed the American Society of International Law in Washington. He pro-
nounced support for Stimson's proposal and advocated not only the necessity
of Nazi leader prosecution, but also the importance of fairness. 52 Roosevelt had
"steadily and insistently favored a speedy but fair trial for these men," but,
Jackson said, he remained "fearful that if they were punished without public
proof of their crimes and opportunity to defend themselves there would remain
a doubt of their guilt that might raise a myth of martyrdom., 53 Understandably
concerned with the public's reaction to America's endorsement of a trial rather
than immediate execution, Truman needed someone to represent America and
remind its people of the standards of justice central to American law. Upon
hearing Jackson's support in Washington, Truman asked Jackson to become
America's advocate at the Nuremberg trials. 54 Jackson's words and presence
brought the neutrality, impartiality and trust he exemplified on the bench to the
eyes and hearts of Americans and the rest of the world, who eventually came to
support the need for a trial in Europe.55 Churchill even acknowledged that
51. Charles Fairman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, in Robert H. Jackson: 1892-1954, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 435, 445 (1955) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639 (1948)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)).
52. Henry T. King, Jr., Robert Jackson's Vision for Justice and Other Reflections of a Nuremberg
Prosecutor, 88 GEO. L.J. 2421, 2423 (2000) (book review). Jackson supported Stimson's proposal and
the necessity for a fair trial-at least by Anglo-American standards of justice under law-in his address
to the American Society of International Law. He stated:
It seems to me that much hinges on acceptance of the concept of the Court as an independent
body above obligation to any nation or interest. I do not see how we, or any nation of like phi-
losophy, could submit controversies to a court otherwise conceived, and certainly we could
not concede any measure of compulsory jurisdiction to it. Nor do I see how any reputable pro-
fessional man of the Anglo-American tradition could lend his name to a tribunal not of that
character.... We must not use the forms of judicial proceeding to carry out or rationalize pre-
viously settled political or military policy. Farcical judicial trials conducted by us will destroy
confidence in the judicial process as quickly as those conducted by any other people .... The
ultimate principle is that you must put no man on trial under the forms of judicial proceedings
if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty. If you are determined to execute a
man in any case, there is no occasion for a trial; the world yields no respect to courts that are
organized merely to convict.
EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 316-17 (1958).
53. Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL xxxiv (1999).
54. GERHART, supra note 52, at 317.
55. Jackson constantly professed the need for a fair trial, and through his eloquent words, he con-
vinced the world. He stated:
To free them without a trial would mock the dead and make cynics of the living. On the other
hand, we could execute or otherwise punish them without a hearing. But undiscriminating
executions or punishments without definite findings of guilt, fairly arrived at, would violate
pledges repeatedly given, and would not set easily on the American conscience or be remem-
bered by our children with pride.
Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation:
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 303 (1994) (quoting
ROBERT JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 8 (1971)).
The only course, in my view, was for the victors to behave as civilized victors and take the re-
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"[n]ow that the trials are over, I think the President was right and I was
wrong."
56
D. ChiefJustice Earl Warren: Chairman of Commission to Investigate the
Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (The Warren
Commission)
Justice William J. Brennan coined the term "Superchief' to describe his
colleague, Chief Justice Earl Warren based on Warren's performance as the
leader of the Court.5 7 Warren had learned from previous public service in his
native state of California 58 "'to lead, to manage, to set a tone, and to get re-
sults.' As such, he brought more authority to the position of Chief Justice than
had been seen for years." 59 He had a reputation before his appointment to the
Court as "a solid, well-meaning, and rather nonpartisan public servant."
60
President Eisenhower picked Warren to replace former Chief Justice Vinson
because of Warren's "integrity, honesty, middle-of-the-road philosophy." 61 It
was hoped that Warren could resolve conflicts among the Justices "during a
time of tremendous social and political controversy. ' '62 Warren conquered this
feat in his first five years on the Court.
63
Warren was never considered a learned legal scholar, but he also never pre-
tended to be one. 64 To him, the "right result took precedence over doctrinal
clarity and consistency. ''65 Professor Martin Shapiro has labeled Warren's ju-
risprudence a "jurisprudence of values." 66
sponsibilities implicit in demanding and accepting capitulation of the whole German state and
population. Unless history was to lay the war guilt and the guilt for organized programs of
atrocities upon the whole German people, some process must identify those individuals who
were in fact responsible and make an authentic record of their deeds.
Jackson, supra note 53, at xxxiv.
56. Jackson, supra note 54, at xxxiv.
57. Earl Warren, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 501, 502
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
58. From 1920 until he took his seat on the Court, Earl Warren served continually in public office
in his home state of California. Without interruptions, he served as a deputy in the Alameda County dis-
trict attorney's office, as a district attorney for thirteen years, as California Attorney General for four
years, and as governor serving three terms. A few days after Warren announced that he would not run
for a fourth term as governor, the Chief Justice of the United States, Fred. M. Vinson died. President
Eisenhower subsequently picked Governor Warren to succeed him. See Anthony Lewis, Earl Warren, in
4 THE JUSTICES, supra note 32, at 1373, 1380-81.
59. Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Earl Warren. Super Chief in Action, 33 TULSA L.J. 477, 480
(1997) (quoting G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 152 (1982)).
60. Earl Warren, supra note 57, at 502.
61. Lewis, supra note 58, at 1381 (quoting President Eisenhower).
62. Earl Warren, supra note 57, at 502-03.
63. Id. at 503.
64. Schwartz, supra note 59, at 479. Warren once told an audience, "I wish that I could speak to
you in the words of a scholar, but it has not fallen to my lot to be a scholar in life." Id.
65. Earl Warren, supra note 57, at 507.
66. Id.
Yale Law & Policy Review
To Warren, justice meant seeing that the right side, the good side, prevailed
in the particular case. As Anthony Lewis wrote in a biographical sketch, War-
ren "really did believe, to use Justice [John] Harlan's phrase, that he sat as a
judge to do good where good was needed. 6 7 Most often his sympathy lay with
the individual victim of governmental restraints; but interestingly, he also voted
to sustain government action when he saw the need for social control of some
evil, such as gambling or obscenity, despite charges of inconsistency. Notwith-
standing Warren's political background, "he recognized that a judge should not
seek popular favor; he never hesitated in the fact of opposition from Congress
or the organized bar or public opinion."68 All this made Warren more than just
a judge in the public's eyes. "[T]o the public in the United States and much of
the world he became a symbol.... Warren represented to them the hope of
America.... for the majority, he was a reminder of what seemed lost American
virtues: openness, optimism, idealism without ideology."
69
Accordingly, while America grieved over the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy in November of 1963 and rumors and theories combined to
provide wild explanations, the newly sworn in President Lyndon B. Johnson
saw Warren as the "personification of justice and fairness in this country." 70
The mixed emotions of shock and anger at President Kennedy's assassination,
and the horror of the televised killing of his accused assassin, created an over-
whelmingly popular thirst to know what had happened and why.71 The public
was unsatisfied by the lack of tangible facts and the public conceived of and
believed rumors and theories that presupposed conspiracies of various kinds.
The world began to believe almost anything.72 Therefore, "out of the nation's
suspicions, out of the nation's need for facts, the Warren Commission was
born."
73
President Johnson faced a nation imbued with rumors and suspicions of
governmental and international conspiracies that needed to be repressed. He
understood all too well the need to create an inquisitorial body charged with
discovering the truth. President Johnson knew that any investigative body
charged with unraveling the Kennedy assassination could not be an agency of
the Executive branch.74 "The commission had to be composed of men who
67. Lewis, supra note 58, at 1379.
68. Id. at 1376.
69. Id. A minority in America saw Warren in quite the opposite light and as a convenient symbol of
hate. These individuals composed the group opposed to the Court's decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which held that school segregation is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
70. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-
1969, at 26 (1971).
71. Robert F. Cushman, Why the Warren Commission?, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 477, 477 (1965).
72. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 355 (1977).




were known to be beyond pressure and above suspicion.... The commission
had to be bipartisan and... [it] needed a Republican chairman whose judicial
ability and fairness were unquestioned.,
75
Johnson never considered any candidate other than Chief Justice Warren. It
is a President's duty to bring the nation through such tragedy and "Warren's
personal integrity was a key element in assuring that all the facts would be un-
earthed and that the conclusions would be credible." 76 Thus, just one week after
the Kennedy assassination, Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and
Solicitor General Archibald Cox informed Warren of Johnson's decision to es-
tablish a bipartisan commission to investigate the affair, and asked Warren if he
would serve as chairman. 77 Although Warren thought the idea of such a com-
mission was wise, he vigorously opposed serving on it due to his belief in the
impropriety of Justices taking on extrajudicial appointments. 78
Johnson ultimately convinced Warren to head the commission through an
appeal to the Chief Justice's patriotism and to the severity and urgency of the
matter. 79 Johnson recalls his conversation with Warren:
In World War I he had put a rifle to his shoulder and offered to give his life, if nec-
essary, to save his country. I said I didn't care who brought me a message about
how opposed he was to this assignment. When the country is confronted with
threatening divisions and suspicions and its foundation is being rocked, and the
President of the United States says that you are the only man who can handle the
matter, you won't say "no," will you?
80
Once again, a President only needed to look to the highest court in the na-
tion. Johnson knew that the only way to convince the nation and the world that
the investigation would be conducted fairly, comprehensively, and objectively,
and would produce an ultimately just conclusion, would be to appoint as
chairman an individual who embodied justice and fairness. The Chief Justice
was the obvious choice. He had already established such a reputation in the
eyes of the world and especially in the hearts of the nation. Warren unques-
tionably "lent authority, dignity and stature to the Commission."
8 1
75. Id.
76. Id. at 26-27.
77. WARREN, supra note 72, at 355-56.
78. Id. at 356. For further discussion of Warren's original position concerning the impropriety of
Supreme Court Justices taking on such extrajudicial appointments, see infra Section III.B. Warren ex-
pressed his disapproval of such practices by prior Justices and their detrimental effects on the Court it-
self and the Court's authority. Id.
79. See JOHNSON, supra note 70, at 27; see also WARREN, supra note 72, at 357 (retelling the con-
versation that he had with President Johnson at the White House when Johnson convinced him to chair
the commission due to the emergency and necessity of the situation and because his country needed him
to be there for her).
80. JOHNSON, supra note 70, at 27.
81. Cushman, supra note 71, at 502.
Yale Law & Policy Review
III. OPPOSITION TO EXTRAJUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
A. Historical Opposition
The early historical examples set forth above "might lead one to conclude
that extra-judicial service has the sanction of history. ' 82 But these extrajudicial
activities were not always accepted as within the limits of the Constitution or
endorsed by the Justices themselves. From the outset, in fact, Americans have
debated the prudence of such extrajudicial activities of Supreme Court Jus-
tices.
83
Chief Justice Jay felt that "judges should avoid any extra-judicial activity
which would threaten their ability to judge impartially. It was, Jay asserted...
neither 'illegal [n]or unconstitutional, however it may be inexpedient, to em-
ploy [judges] for other purposes, provided the latter purposes be consistent and
compatible with the 'judges' basic function. ' '84 Jay's opposition existed only to
the extent that such extrajudicial activities would interfere with a judge's neu-
trality and impartiality in America's adversarial system. His opinion is obvious
in correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State at the time. In a
letter dated July 18, 1793, Jefferson asked Chief Justice Jay for an expansion of
the Court's advisory relationship to the President:
The President ... would be much relieved if he found himself free to refer ques-
tions.., to the opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States,
whose knowledge of the subject would secure us against errors dangerous to the
peace of the United States, and their authority insure the respect of all parties.
85
In a letter dated August 8, 1793, the Justices declined to accept an advisory
role to Washington. Although not specifically commented upon in the Justices'
letter, there is ample evidence that the Justices were wary of intruding upon and
destroying the neutrality and impartiality of the Court.86 As Wheeler has com-
mented, "the Justices thought that they would retain a bias toward an opinion
once publicly stated .... [They] simply did not trust themselves, or later judges
following their precedent, to be able to change their opinion so easily." 87 Jay
82. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison Re-
visited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417,466 (1997).
83. See id.
84. Wheeler, supra note 20, at 131 (quoting from a letter reprinted in 2 GRIFFIN J. MCREE, THE
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 292, 294 (1857)).
85. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices, (July 18, 1793) re-
printed in PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 65 (3d ed. 1988).
One of the reasons Jefferson gave for seeking advice on such important matters from the highest
court was that the Court's authority would "insure the respect of all parties." Id. Again, there is the con-
viction that the Justices were perceived as neutral and fair and thus commanded the respect and trust of
people. Accordingly, men like Jefferson and Washington looked to them to instill such a societal convic-
tion regarding other activities.




had warned in a 1790 letter to Washington that "judges were reluctant to 'relin-
quish sentiments publicly' . . . [s]uch reluctances 'not infrequently infuse into
the minds of the most upright men some degree of partiality for their official
and public acts.'88
The Justices were not only aware of their own vulnerabilities but were also
conscious of the public's subsequent perception of such bias. It was apparent to
these early Justices that, in the words of Justice O'Connor, "[t]he Court's
power lies ... in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception."
89
Wheeler concludes that "the 1793 incident was more than a refusal to give ad-
vice. It was a part of a broader attempt by the early Supreme Court to deempha-
size the obligatory extrajudicial service concept, so widely held in the early pe-
riod." 90
From the standpoint of an originalist, the 1787 Federal Convention debates
concerning the Tenure and Compensation Clause of Article III arguably
provide additional proof of the delegates' foresight.91 They understood that the
judiciary's power lay solely in its integrity and legitimacy-characteristics a
Court can maintain only through an appearance of neutrality and impartiality.
Without speaking directly to the impropriety of Justices accepting extrajudicial
roles, the debates focused on the necessity of judicial independence from the
other branches of government in order for the judiciary to properly function. 92
The sentiment of the delegates' convictions does, however, speak to impartial-
ity in addition to independence, for only a judiciary that can decide issues with-
out fear of removal from office or decrease in salary can be viewed universally
as not only independent but also impartial.
The Federalist Papers unambiguously allude to this sentiment. In Federalist
No. 78, Alexander Hamilton supported his defense of the Tenure Clause of Ar-
ticle III by asserting its ability to help maintain the public's necessary percep-
tion of the judiciary as the "citadel of... the public security" 93 -implying that
the people "must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be
the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution." 94 It follows that
88. Id. (quoting from a letter by Jay reprinted in 2 MCREE, supra note 84, at 293).
89. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
90. Wheeler, supra note 20, at 158.
91. Article III provides that "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
92. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 29, at 37-49 (rev. ed. 1937) (discussing the Compensation Clause as
a means to secure the judiciary's independence); id. at 428-30 (rejecting a proposal to subject judges to
removal by the Executive because it would weaken judicial independence). For a discussion of dele-
gates' consideration ofjudicial independence, see Krotoszynski, supra note 82, at 457-59.
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000); see gener-
ally Krotoszynski, supra note 82, at 459-61 (pointing to three Federalist Papers that demonstrate the
Framers' intent to safeguard the independence and impartiality of the federal judiciary).
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 94, at 496.
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"the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter."95
According to Hamilton, this requires independence and impartiality, character-
istics logically supported through permanency in office. 96 Such permanence
further suggests that the appearance of impartiality is necessary to sustain the
judiciary as a source of public security.
Similarly in Federalist No. 79, Hamilton emphasized an independent and
impartial judiciary supported through the Compensation Clause. "Next to
permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges, than a fixed provision for their support." 97 Hamilton evoked the com-
monality of the realization that "[i]n the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. '98 According
to Hamilton, this provision, together with the provision regarding tenure,
"affords a better prospect" of the Justices' independence. 99 Arguably, Hamilton
refers to a phenomenon of dependency obvious to him, and one that he believed
to be unequivocal to the public as well given its characterization as "human na-
ture." Therefore, Hamilton strove to justify both the Tenure and Compensation
Clauses as means of providing an impartial appearance to the public, for to-
gether, they "afford a better prospect."
100
This historical evidence portrays the delegates as individuals who endeav-
ored to create a government and a constitution that imbued the judiciary with
the utmost appearance of impartiality and independence. The delegates in-
tended these two clauses to provide the public with a more definitive and de-
fensible vision of impartiality. These historical figures did not directly speak to
extrajudicial activities of Supreme Court Justices as weakening the judiciary's
legitimizing appearance of impartiality. However, the delegates analogously
opposed framing the Constitution in a way that might similarly deteriorate the
crucial appearance of impartiality whether through the limited duration of
appointments or through unstable salaries.
B. Supreme Court Justices' Opposition
"The ultimate inquiry remains whether a particular extrajudicial assignment
undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch," wrote Justice Blackmun in
Mistretta v. United States.'0' Recognizing such ethical concerns, members of
95. Id. at 497.
96. Id.
97. Krotoszynski, supra note 82, at 460-61 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 504 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000)).
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 97, at 504.
99. Id. at 505.
100. See id.
101. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989). In Mistretta, the Court noted that "the
participation of federal judges on the Sentencing Commission does not threaten, either in fact or in ap-
pearance, the impartiality of the Judicial Branch." Id. at 407. Although the Court ultimately concluded
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the Court are unequivocally aware that "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That
reputation may not be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work in
the neutral colors of judicial action."' 10 2
Former Chief Justice Harlan Stone was probably the most outspoken
Justice in his opposition to such extrajudicial service. Finding it his own
responsibility as Chief Justice to preserve the judiciary's integrity and imparti-
ality, Justice Stone tried to set a standard by declining numerous appointments
to commissions and by consistently opposing "prying justices from their posts
for special duty under the direction of the President or of Congress."'0 3 In 1942,
for example, Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Chief Justice Stone to head an inves-
tigatory commission into the rubber industry:
A rancorous quarrel had developed in the administration's handling of the nation's
rubber supply.... [T]he President sought to take these perplexing questions out of
politics by naming an investigating commission so thoroughly respectable that few
would dare dispute its findings. As he envisaged it, the recommendations of a be-
loved elder statesman could restore peace among his feuding aides, placate Con-104
gress and the citizenry.
Accordingly, Roosevelt looked to Chief Justice Stone. In response to
Roosevelt's letter requesting his services, Stone wrote:
Apart from the generally recognized consideration that it is highly undesirable for a
judge to engage actively in public or private undertakings other than the perform-
ance of his judicial functions, there are special considerations which I think must be
regarded as controlling here .... A judge, and especially the Chief Justice, cannot
engage in political debate or make public defense of his acts .... He exposes him-
self to attack and indeed invites it, which because of his peculiar situation inevitably
impairs his value as a judge and the appropriate influence of his office. 
10 5
The Chief Justice reiterated his opposition through his refusal to accept yet
another proffered position, chairmanship of the United States Ballot Commis-
sion.106 Stone regarded such a position as "incompatible with obligations which
that the judge's participation did not threaten the impartiality of the Judicial Branch, the opinion is rele-
vant, for purposes of this Note, in that members of the Court expressed a clear awareness and were vocal
about the need for restraint from participation in activities that will threaten the ethical considerations of
impartiality.
102. Id. at407.
103. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The View of Chief Justice Stone, 67
HARV. L. REV. 193, 201 (1953).
104. Id. The quarrel between the farm bloc congressmen and the powerful oil industry focused on
conflicting methods of making rubber synthetically. Id.
105. Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added). In support of his decision to decline Roosevelt's request,
Stone cites the historical examples of extrajudicial activities of Supreme Court Justices and regards such
participation of Jay and Ellsworth negatively.
We must not forget that it is the judgment of history that two of my predecessors, Jay and
Ellsworth, failed in the obligations of their office and impaired their legitimate influence by
participation in executive action in the negotiation of treaties.... [I]t is not by mere chance
that every Chief Justice since has confined his activities strictly to the performance of his judi-
cial duties.
Id. at 204.
106. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 998 n.25. The Commission was created to handle the problem of
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I assumed with the office of Chief Justice, and as likely to impair my useful-
ness in that office.... [I]t might have political implications and political con-
sequences which should be wholly disassociated from the duties of the judicial
office."' 1 7 Chief Justice Stone declined a variety of other positions'08 and
expressed his deep disturbance at Justice Jackson's participation in the Nurem-
berg Trials-a disturbance based in his fear that such activities by members of
the Court would damage its reputation and influence. 10 9 In his view, the judicial
role required neutrality. Chief Justice Stone believed that the way to maintain
an appearance of neutrality and ultimately the legitimacy of the judicial branch
was to avoid such extrajudicial postings as a "prophylactic safeguard."' 1 0
Justice Owen J. Roberts regretted his own service on two commissions,
stating afterwards that "I do not think it was good for my position as a Justice,
nor do I think it was a good thing for the Court.""' Accusations of Justice
Roberts's bias and unfairness while on the German-American Mixed Claims
Commission and while on the investigation into Pearl Harbor fueled such
doubts.112 The investigation into the Pearl Harbor disaster was so controversial
that Congress actually investigated Justice Roberts's investigation."1
3
Roberts referred to these experiences as "unfortunate" and "unpleasant" due
to the reputation they afforded his character and the partiality with which they
tainted the Court as a result. 114 His newly-found opposition after service on
these commissions went so far as to lead him to support a proposal that "the
Chief Justice or any associate justice or any judge of any other court of the
United States shall not, during his term in office, hold any other governmental
or public office or position."'i5
Although Chief Justice Earl Warren ultimately agreed to head the commis-
sion charged with investigating the assassination of President Kennedy, he did
so only after his initial refusal and with serious misgivings regarding accep-
tance of such a position."16 In his autobiography, Warren rationalized his reser-
soldiers voting during the war. Id.
107. Id. (citing Letter from Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, 89
CONG. REC. 9791 (1943)).
108. In addition to those mentioned, Stone declined to act as head of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, to serve on the panel of judges of the Hague arbitrations, and to head a committee on traffic safety.
Mason, supra note 103, at 208, 209, 214.
109. Seeidat214-15.
110. Krotoszynski, supra note 82, at 468.
111. Roberts, supra note 35, at 2.
112. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 998 n.25.
113. Id.
114. See Roberts, supra note 35, at 2.
115. Id. Roberts stated that he felt "very strongly that that would be a great protection to the Court."
Id. Obviously, Roberts was referring to the damage he felt that his participation on such commissions
caused the Court.
116. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 21, at 1137 (noting Warren's initial eloquent and persuasive




First, it is not in the spirit of constitutional separation of powers to have a member
of the Supreme Court serve on a presidential commission; second, it would distract
a Justice from the work of the Court, which had a heavy docket; and, third, it was
impossible to foresee what litigation such a commission might spawn, with result-
ing disqualification of the Justice from sitting in such cases. I then told them that,
historically, the acceptance of diplomatic posts by Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth,
had not contributed to the welfare of the Court, that the service of five Justices on
the Hayes-Tilden Commission had demeaned it, that the appointment of Justice
Roberts as chairman to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster had served no good
purpose, and that the action of Justice Robert Jackson in leaving the Court for a year
to become chief prosecutor at [Nuremburg] after World War II had resulted in divi-
siveness and internal bitterness on the Court.
117
Despite Chief Justice Warren's eventual acceptance of the appointment, his
prudential and ethical objections based on the negative historical results of such
actions are critical and noteworthy in opposing extrajudicial appointments of
Supreme Court Justices."1
8
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers convened in
1969 to hear testimonies, including those from retired Supreme Court Justices,
regarding extrajudicial activities of judges. 1 9 Former Justice Arthur J. Gold-
117. WARREN, supra note 72, at 356.
118. See, e.g., In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 783 F.2d 370, 377-78 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citing Warren's comments as an example of individual opposition to judicial participation in extrajudi-
cial bodies); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 401 n.26 (reflecting on Warren's "lament on the subject" of extraju-
dicial service as an example of judicial reservation or regret regarding such service); Krotoszynski, su-
pra note 82, at 464-65 (referring to Warren as an example of the continued and historical controversy
regarding extrajudicial appointments and stating that "Chief Justice Warren's acceptance of the
appointment, however, did not allay or assuage his constitutional and prudential concerns about under-
taking this extrajudicial assignment"); Ackerman, supra note 6, at 999 n.25 (quoting Warren for an
example ofjudicial criticism regarding participation by federal judges in such activities).
119. The Subcommittee met for the stated purpose of addressing the problem of"nonjudicial activi-
ties of federal judges" and discussing "S. 1097 and S. 2109, bills which are representative of possible
legislative approaches to the problem." Hearings, supra note 6, at 1. The testimonies are replete with
references to judicial independence and canons of ethics as sources of concern in addition to the doctrine
of separation of powers. In re President's Comm'n, 783 F.2d at 379.
The Committee heard from academics, Senators and members of the legal community in addition to
retired Supreme Court Justices. Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., chairman of the Subcommittee and U.S. Senator
from North Carolina, said in the opening statements of the second series of hearings on September 30,
1969, that witnesses from the first series of hearings reached no consensus
about the desirability of legislation at all. Some questioned the authority of Congress in impos-
ing strictures on the judiciary, but felt that in prohibiting the Executive from appointing judges
to special assignments, the Congress would be on sure ground. Others contended that the can-
ons of ethics already in force are sufficient. Still others believed the question should be left to
the individual judges themselves, not even to their colleagues.
Hearings, supra note 6, at 157. There is a similar resolve at the end of the second series of hearings. See
id. These legislative efforts were never reported out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Solomon
Slonim, Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of the Separation of Powers, 49 CONN. B.J. 391, 395
n. 15 (1975). The court in In re President's Commission found that "most of the witnesses and corre-
spondents disapproved of judges undertaking such assignments as the Warren and Pearl Harbor Com-
missions as well as the Nuremberg trials. There was strong support for judges participating in such areas
as judicial administration, rule-making, and similar matters closely related to the courts." 783 F.2d at
379. Further,
[t]he 1969 hearings [were] not the first time that extrajudicial service by federal judges has en-
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berg testified in support of specific ground rules that should be adopted by fed-
eral judges themselves as opposed to the legislature mandating appropriate non-
judicial conduct. 2 0 Goldberg asserted that "we are a country which depends,
rightly, upon the consent of the governed, the perpetuation of the judicial sys-
tem and preservation of the rule of law requires public confidence both in the
independence and in the integrity of the judiciary."''21 Accordingly, Goldberg
noted that "now the present is the time for judges to refrain from engaging in
activities which, however proper in an abstract sense, have a potential to create
doubt and confusion in the present public mind.', 12 2 "[J]udges ought to be
guided by the principle that judicial duties come first and that nothing should
be done or said which would even appear to compromise the independence and
integrity of the individual judge, or of the courts as institutions." 123
As the above discussion demonstrates, Supreme Court Justices are both
aware of and vocal regarding their opposition to such extrajudicial activities in
order to preserve appearances of impartiality and neutrality essential to main-
tain the judiciary's legitimacy. 124
C. Canons of Judicial Ethics
The American Bar Association provided additional criticism and opposition
to Supreme Court Justices' participation in such activities when, in 1972 and
countered congressional criticism. In 1947, the Senate Judiciary committee concluded that,
"The practice of using federal judges for nonjudicial activities is undesirable. The practice
holds great danger of working a diminution of the prestige of the judiciary. It is a determent
(sic) to the proper functioning of the judicial branch of the government."
Id. at 379-80 (quoting NOMINATIONS OF HONORABLE MARVIN JONES AND HONORABLE JOHN CASKEY
COLLOT, S. Rep. No. 80-7 (1947)).
120. Hearings, supra note 6, at 159. Justice Goldberg felt that "it is helpful for our judges to know
what is deemed appropriate conduct.., to avoid the appearance of impropriety, it helps both the public
and the judge to know the guidelines." Id.
121. Id. at 158.
122. Id. at 159.
123. Id. at 165.
124. For purposes of this Note, the discussion is limited to comments of opposition by Supreme
Court Justices. However, this is not meant to discount the numerous other federal judges that voiced
their opposition to such extrajudicial activities.
At the 1969 Hearings, for example, the Senate Subcommittee heard testimony from Hon. David T.
Lewis, judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and from Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, for-
mer judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Hearings, supra note 6, at
45-58, 76-84.
Judge Skelly Wright, a former judge for the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, ob-
serves that "public confidence in the judiciary is indispensable to the operation of the law; yet this qual-
ity is placed in risk whenever judges step outside the courtroom into the vortex of political activity."
Restani & Bloom, supra note 18, at 1674-75.
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
wrote an article that generally "explains and defends an independent federal judiciary.... According to
Judge Kaufman, 'the essence of judicial independence.. . is the preservation of a separate institution of
government that can adjudicate cases or controversies with impartiality."' Krotoszynski, supra note 82,
at 470 (discussing and quoting Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 671 (1980)).
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again in 1990, it adopted several provisions restricting the extrajudicial activi-
ties of judges. Scholars have suggested that these rules, embedded in the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, "might be read to require federal judges to decline
service" 125 in such extrajudicial activities and commissions.
Canon 4 states: "A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra-judicial activi-
ties as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations., 126 Subsection
C(2) of Canon 4 reads:
A judge shall not accept appointment to a governmental committee or commission
or other governmental position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on
matters other than the improvement of law, the legal system or the administration of
justice. A judge may, however, represent a country, state or locality on ceremonial
occasions or in connection with historical, educational or cultural activities. 127
The commentary to Canon 4C(2) offers the following significant observa-
tions:
The. appropriateness of accepting extra-judicial assignments must be assessed in
light of the demands on judicial resources created by crowded dockets and the need
to protect the courts from involvement in extra-judicial matters that may prove to be
controversial. Judges should not accept governmental appointments that are likely
to interfere with the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary. 2 8
The 1994 Code of Conduct for Judges and Judicial Employees took a simi-
lar position on the propriety of extrajudicial positions. It instructs that a "judge
should not, in any event, accept such an appointment if the judge's governmen-
tal duties would interfere with the performance of judicial duties or tend to
undermine the integrity, impartiality or independence of the judiciary." 129
Commentary to the Code of Conduct suggests that this canon was meant to
ensure that extrajudicial service does not "interfere with the performance of the
judge's judicial responsibilities or tend to undermine public confidence in the
judiciary."' 30
D. Contemporary Academic Opposition
Much of the academic opposition has already been touched upon through-
out this Note. The following section, however, highlights the academic litera-
ture's unfailing stress on notions of impartiality and impropriety that a Justice's
extrajudicial service is thought to threaten.' 31
125. Restani & Bloom, supra note 18, at 1676.
126. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (1990).
127. Id. at Canon 4C(2).
128. Id. at Canon 4C(2), cmt.
129. 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, CODES OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES AND
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES Canon 5G (Oct. 1994).
130. Id. at Canon 5G, cmt.
131. The academic articles cited are only a few among others that allude to the necessary preserva-
tion of the appearance of justice as the logic behind opposition to extrajudicial activities. See, e.g., John
J. Parker, The Judicial Office in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 225, 236 (1948); Hearings, su-
pra note 6 (including the testimony and written statements of numerous academics).
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Although analyses of the separation of powers doctrine form the basis of
much academic opposition to extrajudicial activities of Supreme Court Justices,
one can remove language focused on ethical considerations and accepted no-
tions of propriety in judicial conduct. For example, an article by Steven
Calabresi and Joan Larsen on the doctrine of separation of powers appeals to
the necessary appearance of impartiality that can easily be stripped from the
Court:
While one can understand and sympathize with a President's yearning to draw on
the prestige of the federal courts to solve tough crises, the entanglement of judges in
controversial undertakings, no matter how important, must, in the end, cause harm
to the federal judiciary by stripping it of the appearance of impartial detachment
that sustains judicial legitimacy and effectiveness.
Solomin Slonim briefly mentions the issues of judicial ethics, propriety,
and conflict of interest that may arise upon judicial acceptance of private and
informal contacts between the judiciary and the executive. 34 Similarly, Ronald
J. Krotoszynski makes continual and consistent reference to an independent,
nonpartisan, and neutral judiciary as essential to the legitimacy of the federal
courts. "The judicial role required neutrality with respect to both the particular
subject matter at hand and the particular litigant before the court. Executive
branch postings potentially compromised a judge in both respects .... ,,135 Ac-
cording to Krotoszynski, history dictates a "clear rule, with only occasional ex-
ceptions" that there must be a "careful separation of the judicial function from
the political branches, in order to protect the independence and neutrality-and
hence the legitimacy-of both Article III decisionmakers and their deci-
sions."'13
6
Several articles focus on the ethical factors and impropriety in such extraju-
dicial activities of Supreme Court Justices, independent of a separation of pow-
ers analysis. Robert McKay, for example, warns of the public perception of im-
propriety and the practical and ethical hazards associated with judicial
involvement in extrajudicial functions. 137 According to McKay, the hazards to
guard against are:
133. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 21, at 1144. It follows that while Warren's service lent author-
ity, dignity and stature to the Commission,
one can only speculate as to the amount of authority, dignity, and stature he would have
stripped from the Court had he demonstrated incompetence in his executive role.... [T]he
mere fact that a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was so intimately associated with an in-
vestigation that has engendered such lingering controversy and speculation can only have had
the collateral effect of diminishing the public's confidence in the Court.
Id. Further, according to the authors, "[m]uch the same could be said of Justice Jackson's involvement
in the prosecution of the Nuremberg Trials." Id.
134. Slonin, supra note 119, at 395.
135. Krotoszynski, supra note 82, at 468.
136. Id.
137. McKay, supra note 5, at 9.
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(1) participation in outside activities so extensive that the time and energy available
for the primary obligation are measurably impaired; (2) participation in out-of-court
activities that may lead to actual bias or the appearance of prejudgment of issues
likely to come before the court; and (3) actions that impair the dignity and esteem in
which the court should be held.
138
Expanding upon the third hazard, McKay regards judicial acceptance of ap-
pointments to commissions, boards and other public service positions as dimin-
ishing the "prestige" of the Court.1 39 "Whenever issues that are highly visible
and sensitive are entrusted to a public commission for resolution or recommen-
dation, the results are unlikely to satisfy all the critics, perhaps none. Participa-
tion... lend[s] credence to the all-too-common charge that the courts are part
of the political process." 140 Jackson's participation in the Nuremberg Trials re-
sulted in a year-and-a-half absence from Washington and "was an embarrass-
ment to the Court[,]" for it interfered with Jackson's performance of his official
duties. 14 McKay calls for a return not only to the reality, but also to the ap-
pearance of impartial service to the cause ofjustice.
Wendy Ackerman similarly demonstrates a regard for ethical considera-
tions of propriety, impartiality, and neutrality upon acceptance of judicial ser-
vice on presidential commissions. "Judicial service on presidential commis-
sions may threaten judicial impartiality because it could bias a judge in favor of
viewpoints that he or his colleagues promoted as members of a commission.
This concern is particularly grave since impartiality constitutes the essence of
the judicial function."' 42 Ackerman acknowledges that "not only must a judge
in fact be independent and impartial in resolving disputes, but the public must
also perceive this to be the case .... A court's effectiveness in applying the
law to the parties depends on its public image as a fair and neutral arbiter of
"'143disputes .... Accordingly, Ackerman opposes judicial participation on
presidential commissions because it "can easily tarnish the appearance of im-
partiality. If a judge is viewed as having a personal interest in governmental ac-
tion that makes prejudgment likely, or as being under the wing of the executive
branch, public confidence in the judiciary will diminish." 144
IV. THE PARADOX'S MEANING
Recognition of this paradox perhaps places an additional burden on both the
executive and the judiciary to incorporate its effects into any decision to ap-
point a Justice to an extrajudicial activity and into any acceptance of such an
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1011-12.
143. Id. at 1017.
144. Id. at 1018.
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appointment. This Note does not attempt to dispute the clear advantages and
often seeming necessity of appointing a neutral and impartial figure such as a
Supreme Court Justice serving in such extrajudicial capacities. It does, how-
ever, point to the extraordinary similarity between the obvious advantages and
the more obscure disadvantages, perhaps allowing the disadvantages to appear
as obvious as the advantages.
A Justice's unique situation requires more than literal neutrality and impar-
tiality. It requires the Justice to maintain a crucial appearance of impartiality.
More often a Justice's participation in extrajudicial activities risks the deterio-
ration of this appearance as opposed to any literal wear on a Justice's impartial-
ity. Maintenance of this appearance forms the basis of the prudential and the
ethical opposition to such appointments and ironically parallels the President's
understandable desire to appoint the Justice. Recognition of this ironic parallel
should impose on the executive and the judiciary a better understanding and
appreciation for the disadvantages of a Justice's service in such capacities.
Although this paradox should help elucidate the opposition, it is not in-
tended to encourage an absolute sanction to extrajudicial activities. A Justice,
upon understanding this paradox, should proceed with caution, and as Justice
Goldberg stated, "nothing should be done or said which would even appear to
compromise the independence and integrity of the individual judge, or of the
courts as institutions."'' 45 A Justice's experience and propensity for making
logical decisions should allow her to understand that a reputation for impartial-
ity cannot be borrowed by the political branches without cost and to decline
those appointments where the executive asks the Justice to lend her character. It
is not necessary for the legislature to enact an absolute sanction, for the burden
should rest with the Justices who, with the benefit of hindsight regarding previ-
ous Justices' activities and their own experiences, should be able to distinguish
the extrajudicial activities that tend to create the appearance of partiality.
Similarly, although recognition of the paradox should restrict a President
from automatically turning to the Court for such appointments, it should not
absolutely preclude such actions. A President, too, should proceed with caution
and perhaps turn to other well-respected and seemingly impartial figures in so-
ciety who could provide a similar air of neutrality and trustworthiness without
fear of weakening the appearance of impartiality so sacred to this country's ju-
dicial branch and adversarial theory ofjustice.
V. CONCLUSION
A Justice sits on the Supreme Court with an air of dignity, accomplishment,
intelligence, and merit instilled in the opportunity to occupy that position. A
Justice's acceptance of this position almost automatically imbues her with an
145. Hearings, supra note 6, at 165.
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absolute character of impartiality, neutrality, fairness, and justice. It is Amer-
ica's dedication to the adversary system that imposes this historically stereo-
typed character on a Justice. Yet the adversary model also dictates that a Justice
must preserve this character and never leak partiality or bias. For with the col-
lapse of a Justice's neutrality and impartiality, her legitimacy and that of the
Court is destroyed.
The paradox that is the subject of this Note rests solely upon this imbued
character of impartiality. Presidents have consistently looked to Justices of the
Supreme Court to serve extrajudicial roles because of these characteristics and
the public's subsequent perception. Yet many oppose such extrajudicial service
precisely because of these characteristics and the necessity that Justices in our
adversarial system both literally and figuratively maintain this impartial and
neutral character in the eyes of the public. This paradox may provide scholar-
ship with a better understanding of why Presidents continually look to the
bench and why there will always be opposition. I invite both opponents and
proponents to realize that the reasoning behind their respective opinions is also
the strength behind the other's rationale. It is a realization that should instruct
the opposition to perhaps reevaluate their opinions and Presidents to reevaluate
their prospective appointments in light of the paradox.

